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Ghosts, Murderers, and the Semantics
of Descriptions
Anders J. Schoubye
Noûs (2013) 47, 3:496-533
It is widely agreed that sentences containing a non-denoting description embedded in the
scope of a propositional attitude verb have true de dicto interpretations, and Russell’s (1905)
analysis of definite descriptions is often praised for its simple analysis of such cases, cf. e.g.
Neale (1990). However, several people, incl. Elbourne (2005; 2010), Heim (1991), and
Kripke (2005), have contested this by arguing that Russell’s analysis yields incorrect predictions
in non-doxastic attitude contexts. Heim and Elbourne have subsequently argued that
once certain facts about presupposition projection are fully appreciated, the Frege/Strawson
analysis of definite descriptions has an explanatory advantage. In this paper, I argue that both
Russell’s analysis and the Frege/Strawson analysis face a serious problem when it comes to
the interaction of attitude verbs and definite descriptions. I argue that the problem observed
by Elbourne, Heim, and Kripke is much more general than standardly assumed and that a
solution requires a revision of the semantics of definite and indefinite descriptions. I outline
the conditions that are required to solve the problem and present an analysis couched in
dynamic semantics which can provide a solution. I conclude by discussing some further issues
related to propositional attitude verbs that complicate a fully general solution to the problem.
1 Introduction
Suppose Bertrand falsely believes that there is a king of France and that the king of
France is bald. If so, a speaker can truly and felicitously report Bertrand’s belief by
asserting (1).
(1) Bertrand believes that the king of France is bald.
The gospel among proponents of Russell’s (1905) analysis of definite descriptions
is that Russell’s analysis provides a straightforward way of assigning adequate truth
conditions to sentences such as (1), viz. sentences with non-denoting descriptions
embedded in the scope of a propositional attitude verb. This assignment of truth
conditions relies on two important assumptions. First, the assumption that definite
descriptions assert the existence of a unique individual satisfying the descriptive
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content, i.e. ‘the F is G’ is analyzed as an existentially quantified formula, namely
the formula below.1 ∃x[F(x) ∧ ∀y[F(y) → x = y] ∧ G(x)]
Second, the assumption that de dicto—de re ambiguities, which arise when modal and
quantificational expressions interact, are scope ambiguities; when a modal takes scope
over a quantificational expression, the resulting interpretation is de dicto and when
the embedding order is reversed, the resulting interpretation is de re. Hence, in the
context where Bertrand falsely believes that there is a bald king of France, the true
reading of (1) is captured by analyzing the definite description as embedded in the
scope of the propositional attitude verb, cf. (2). This yields an interpretation where
the existence of a unique French king is part of Bertrand’s belief.2
(2) BELb[∃x[king-of-France(x) ∧ ∀y[king-of-France(y) → x = y] ∧ bald(x)]]
The Russellian analysis thus predicts that the sentence in (1) is true if and only
if Bertrand believes the following conjunction: there is a (unique) king of France
and he (the king of France) is bald. That is, relying on a minimal number of
fairly uncontentious assumptions, the Russellian analysis succeeds in explaining why
some sentences containing non-denoting descriptions have straightforwardly true
interpretations.3
But against this often emphasized virtue of Russell’s theory, Heim (1991),
Kripke (2005), and Elbourne (2005; 2010) argue that Russell’s analysis makes correct
predictions only when the propositional attitudes in question are doxastic. That is,
when the definite description is embedded under a non-doxastic attitude verb, the
Russellian predictions are intuitively incorrect. Consider the example below.
(3) Hans wants the ghost in his attic to be quiet tonight. (Elbourne 2005; 2010)
(3) has both a narrow scope (de dicto) and a wide scope (de re) interpretation, yet
neither interpretation appears to provide the correct truth conditions.
(4) DESh[∃x[ghost-in-attic(x) ∧ ∀y[ghost-in-attic(y) → x = y] ∧ quiet(x)]]
1 I assume that propositions are the objects of assertion, but in order to avoid excessively
convoluted language I will often talk about what e.g. the description asserts and about the
asserted content of the description. This is to be understood only as shorthand for what the
description standardly contributes to the asserted content of the sentence in which it occurs.
Similarly, I sometimes talk about particular expressions triggering presuppositions. This is
to be understood in the following sense: When these expressions occur in a sentence S,
S expresses a proposition only if some other proposition (the presupposition) is common
ground.
2 I abbreviate ⌜a believes/wants that ⌝ as ⌜BELa⌝ and ⌜DESa⌝ respectively. I leave the
semantics of these attitude verbs unspecified for now and focus instead on the semantics
of the complement clauses. I will assume throughout that propositional attitude verbs are
modals, in particular quantifiers over possible worlds.
3 See e.g. Neale (1990, 27) and Ludlow (2007, 3.2)
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On the narrow scope analysis above, the Russellian analysis predicts that (3) is true
if and only if Hans desires the truth of the following conjunction: there is a (unique)
ghost in Hans’ attic and the ghost is quiet. However, this is intuitively inconsistent
with the most natural interpretation of (3). The truth of (3) is compatible with Hans
having no desire that there be a ghost in his attic.
But now consider the wide scope interpretation.
(5) ∃x[ghost-in-attic(x) ∧ ∀y[ghost-in-attic(y) → x = y] ∧ DESh[quiet(x)]]
Here the Russellian analysis predicts that (3) is true if and only if there is a ghost in
Hans’ attic and he wants it to be quiet. The problem is that the truth of (3) does
not appear to saddle the speaker with such a spurious ontological commitment. The
speaker can truly report Hans’ desires using (3) even if there, as a matter of fact, are
no ghosts.
Now, the meaning of the definite is analyzed above in terms of the unary
quantifiers of first-order logic and it is well known that these are inadequate for
analyzing a whole range of determiners of natural language. And since Russell’s
original analysis of ‘the F is G’ is syncategorematic (i.e. no constituent in Russell’s
proposed logical form corresponds to either ‘the’ or ‘the F’), most proponents of
Russell’s analysis nowmaintain that the analysis should be cast in terms of generalized
(or rather restricted) quantifiers.4 Neale (1990) thus adopts the notation in (6) to
represent the ‘logical form’ of ‘the F is G’ and its (Russellian) truth conditions are
then stated as in e.g. (7). The definite determiner is now analyzed as a relation
between two sets.
(6) [The x: F(x)](G(x))
(7) [The x: F(x)](G(x)) is true if and only if ∣F∣ = 1 ∧ ∣F ∩ G∣ ≥ 1
In other words, ‘the F is G’ is true if and only if the cardinality of the set F is exactly
one and the intersection of F and G is greater than, or equal to, one.
What is important to emphasize is that the notation in (6) serves only to indicate
that the definite article is analyzed as a restricted quantifier. This notational
convention is supposed to better reflect that ‘the F’ and ‘the’ are now treated as
proper syntactic and semantic units.5 In other words,
4 For the now standard analysis of generalized quantifiers in natural language, see e.g. Barwise
and Cooper (1981) and Keenan and Stavi (1986).
5 With this notation, the logical form now reflects the syntactic structure of a determiner
combining with a sister node to form a determiner phrase (DP) which is then combined
with a verb phrase (VP) to form a sentence (S). And using restricted quantification, both the
determiner and the determiner phrase can now be given the following semantics:
i. JThe FK = G⟨e,t⟩: ∣F∣ = 1 ∧ ∣F ∩ G∣ ≥ 1
ii. JTheK = F⟨e,t⟩ . G⟨e,t⟩: ∣F∣ = 1 ∧ ∣F ∩ G∣ ≥ 1
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[...] this is not to propose an alternative to Russell’s theory; it is just to find a
more congenial method of stating it. [the x: Fx](Gx) is definitionally equivalent to
(∃x)((∀y)(Fy ≡ y = x) & Gx). (Neale, 1990, 45).
In other words, if definite descriptions are analyzed in terms of restricted quantifiers,
then when the truth conditions of the complement clauses of (1) and (3) are
computed, the Russellian analysis continues to make the right prediction for (1),
but it also continues to make incorrect predictions for (3). And so, if one favors the
restricted quantifier analysis of definite descriptions (which one arguably should),
one still faces the same dilemma, namely that the analysis yields correct predictions
for doxastic attitude verbs but incorrect predictions for non-doxastic attitude verbs.
In conclusion, this problem is a problem about the predicted truth conditions and
since the restricted quantifier analysis simply generates the standard Russellian truth
conditions in a different way, the predictions in these cases are identical.
The problem outlined above now prompts the following question: Why is there
this divergence in the predictions of the Russellian analysis as regards doxastic and
non-doxastic attitude verbs? The answer seems to be the Russellian analysis’ failure
to distinguish between the meanings, i.e. the truth conditions, of sentences such as
(8) and (9).
(8) The ghost is quiet.
(9) There is a unique ghost and it is quiet.
Since definite descriptions are assumed to assert the existence of a unique individual
satisfying the description, the Russellian analysis treats (8) and (9) as having the
same meaning, i.e. as having the same truth conditions. And this appears to be
unproblematic in standard extensional cases since (8) and (9) are true in precisely
the same contexts, viz. contexts that contain exactly one (perhaps maximally salient)
ghost which is quiet. Moreover, in intensional contexts of the doxastic variety,
the putative difference between (8) and (9) again seems inessential. Since it is a
precondition on the truth of (1) that Bertrand believes that there is a unique king
of France, then if c is a context where (1) is true, c is also a context where (10) is true.
(1) Bertrand believes that the king of France is bald.
(10) Bertrand believes that there is a unique king of France and that he is bald.
However, it is not intuitively clear that sentences such as (1) express existential beliefs
on the part of their subjects. It might seem more natural to understand (1) as
presupposing something about Bertrand’s existential beliefs rather than as asserting
it. But when the report in (1) is de dicto, this presupposition is a precondition on the
truth of (1), and so building the presupposition into the asserted content of (1) helps
output the correct truth conditions.
The problem arises when definite descriptions are embedded in the scope of
attitude verbs that do not express beliefs, i.e. non-doxastic attitude verbs. While
a sentence such as (3) also appears to presuppose an existential belief on the part of
the subject, for example that Hans believes that there is a ghost in his attic, such an
existential belief cannot be captured by assuming that the definite description asserts
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existence. Instead, when the attitude in question is non-doxastic, e.g. a desire, a
hope, or a fear, the relevant sentences are predicted to express that the subject of the
attitude verb wants, hopes, or fears that there exists a particular individual satisfying
the description. And this is the cause of the incorrect predictions.
To further illustrate the problem, if a speaker intended to communicate thatHans
wants there to be a (unique) ghost in his attic and for it to be quiet, it seems implausible
that the speaker would succeed by simply asserting (3). Instead, the speaker would
have to use a sentence such as (11).
(3) Hans wants the ghost in his attic to be quiet tonight.
(11) Hans wants there to be a unique ghost in his attic and for it to be quiet.
This problem concerning assertions of existence is however not exclusive to cases
where a definite description is embedded under a propositional attitude verb. The
problem also arises with definite descriptions in conditionals. To illustrate, consider
(12) and (13) below.
(12) If the ghost in my attic is quiet tonight, I might finish my thesis.
(13) If there is a unique ghost in my attic and it is quiet tonight, I might finish my
thesis.
If definite descriptions assert existence, as the Russellian analysis maintains, and
hence are shorthand for complex quantificational statements, one should be able to
effectively paraphrase (12) with (13). But this is intuitively incorrect. If a speaker
asserted (12), it would be natural to assume that she is presupposing (rather than
asserting) that there is a ghost in her attic. That is, it would not be possible to
interpret the speaker as simply contemplating a hypothetical scenario where there
happens to be a ghost in her attic. And, as Elbourne (2010) observes, this intuition
is further supported by the infelicity of (14) and the felicity of (15).
(14) # I’m not sure there are any ghosts in my attic. If the ghost in my attic is
quiet tonight, I might finish my thesis.
(15) I’m not sure there are any ghosts in my attic. If there is a unique ghost in
my attic and it is quiet tonight, I might finish my thesis.
Now, one might be inclined to defend the Russellian analysis by arguing that the
definite description in (12) is naturally read as taking wide scope. This would
straightforwardly explain why (14) sounds contradictory. But there are at least two
significant problems with this explanation. First, given the Russellian analysis, one
would think that both wide and narrow scope readings of (12) should be available,
but this is not consistent with the data.6 There just does not seem to be any
narrow scope reading of the definite description in (12), i.e. (13) is not a possible
6 An anonymous referee notes that one needs not assume that a reading is available simply
because it can be generated by the syntax. For example, one could supplement the syntax
with filtering mechanisms which would then eliminate the unavailable readings. While
I agree with the referee’s point here, I do think that it leaves an explanatory gap. The
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interpretation of (12). The Russellian would therefore have to maintain that definite
descriptions take obligatory wide scope in conditionals.7 Second, it is widely accepted
that antecedents of conditionals are so-called scope islands, i.e. syntactic constituents
from which syntactic movement is prohibited, see e.g. May (1985) and Szabolcsi
(2001). Making the assumption that definite descriptions take obligatory wide scope
would therefore violate this well-established syntactic principle. In sum, it seems
that there is a significant problem here for the standard Russellian analysis of definite
descriptions.8
2 The Existence Problem
2.1 Problem and Plan
The aim of this paper is to answer the following question:
  
What existence commitments do definite descriptions incur and how must
these be analyzed if the apparently incorrect predictions manifested by sen-
tences such as (3) and (12) are to be avoided?
The paper is divided into two sections. In the first, I discuss whether the problematic
predictions can be avoided by adopting a presuppositional analysis of definite
descriptions, in particular the referential Frege/Strawson analysis (to be explicated
in the following sections). Several researchers, cf. Heim (1991) and Elbourne
(2005; 2010), maintain that the Frege/Strawson analysis has a significant advantage
over the Russellian analysis, but I will demonstrate that it is dubious whether the
Frege/Strawson analysis provides a genuine solution to this problem. In particular,
I will argue that the existence problem, as it is standardly framed, is a much
more general problem than normally assumed. Next, elaborating on Elbourne
(2005; 2010), I will show that the existence problem is not a result of complexities
introduced by propositional attitude verbs and that attempts to defend the Russellian
analysis using arguments of that nature fail. I conclude by arguing that both the
orthodox analyses of definite descriptions, namely the Russellian analysis and the
Frege/Strawson analysis, cannot solve the existence problem, i.e. cannot generally
output correct truth conditions for sentences such as (3) and other related sentences.
narrow scope readings are available with most other, if not all, quantificational expressions,
so it seems to me that the proponents of Russell’s analysis owes an explanation for why
these readings are not available with definite descriptions. Moreover, if the syntax were
supplemented with relevant constraints to filter out the undesirable readings, one should
think that such constraints would need to have independent syntactic motivation in order
to be explanatory. And it is not obvious what would motivate such constraints.
7 And for an in-depth discussion (and refutation) of this suggestion, cf. Elbourne (2010)
8 I discuss a range of responses on behalf of the Russellian analysis in subsequent sections.
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In the second section, I outline a range of conditions that any semantic analysis
must satisfy if the existence problem is to be avoided and I sketch a dynamic semantic
analysis of descriptions that satisfies these conditions. I show that my proposed ana-
lysis provides a solution to the problem as it arises in conditionals and I explain what
would be needed to generalize the solution to propositional attitude verbs. I also
show that my analysis is more generally adequate than both of the orthodox analyses.
2.2 The Presuppositional Solution
As demonstrated in the introduction, the existence problem is a product of a semantic
analysis that fails to distinguish the meaning of (8) from the meaning of (9). One
might therefore think that an analysis which does distinguish would provide a simple
solution. One such analysis is a presuppositional analysis.
On the standard view, presuppositions are constraints on use. For example, if an
expression  triggers the presupposition that , it is felicitous for a speaker to use
 in a context c only if  is antecedently established in c, viz. presupposed. On a
presuppositional analysis of definite descriptions, existence of a unique individual is
therefore assumed to be a presupposition, viz. a constraint on its use rather than an
asserted component of its meaning. This means that a sentence of the form ‘the F is
G’ is not analyzed as making the existential claim that there is a unique F, but rather
as a sentence whose use is licensed only if the existence of a unique individual who
is F is already established in the discourse context — only if it is common ground that
there is a unique F.9
So, how is a presuppositional analysis supposed to provide a solution to the
existence problem? The intuitive thought is that if definite descriptions are analyzed
as merely presupposing the existence of a unique F, the existence of this unique F will
not be part of the content of an attitude ascription in whose scope the description is
embedded — and hence the existence problem should fail to arise. This is, crudely
speaking, the view of Heim and Elbourne. However, as it turns out, matters are not
quite this simple. This section is devoted to demonstrating why.
Existence Commitments, Presuppositions, and Partial Functions
There are several ways to formally explicate the existence commitments that definite
descriptions incur. Let’s begin by clearly distinguishing three such ways.
(O1) Analyze definite descriptions as asserting existence. For example, assume that
a definite description contributes an existentially quantified expression to the
truth conditions of the sentence in which it occurs. A speaker who asserts that
the F is G thus effectively asserts that a (unique) F exists.
9 This conception of presuppositions is due, in its essentials, to the pioneering work of
Stalnaker (1970; 1974; 1978).
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(O2) Analyze definite descriptions as presupposing existence, i.e. assume that the as-
serted content contains no existential quantifier and instead that an existential
claim is antecedently established in the common ground. This is what licenses
the use of the definite description. So, a speaker who asserts a sentence such
as ‘the F is G’ does not thereby assert that a unique F exists — the speaker
presupposes that this is common ground.
(O3) Analyze definite descriptions as both presupposing and asserting existence.
The Russellian analysis captures the existence commitments of definite descriptions
as described in (O1). Definite descriptions are analyzed as contributing to the
truth conditions an existentially quantified formula and sentences containing definite
descriptions are thus analyzed as asserting existence. That is, existence is part of the
asserted content. This is, as we saw earlier, the reason that the Russellian analysis
yields correct truth conditions for (1) but also the reason that it runs into the existence
problem.
Two different types of semantic content must be distinguished on a presup-
positional analysis, namely the presupposed content and the asserted content. The
challenge for a putative presuppositional solution to the existence problem is to
provide a formal analysis of these contents which avoids the existence problem
and which in general succeeds in outputting correct truth conditions for sentences
containing definite descriptions.
Now, since presuppositions are characterized as constraints on use— in the sense
that they impose a contextual requirement that the presupposition must be common
ground — existence presuppositions are standardly captured using partial functions.
Let’s assume that the input for a semantic computation is an LF and that
semantic values are computed on the basis of pairwise functional application of lexical
constituents. The definite determiner is then treated as a function that is defined
only if its input argument F is a singleton set — and otherwise undefined. This
captures the above constraint on use since a sentence containing a definite description
is predicted to express a proposition only if F has exactly one member. F is also often
called the restrictor. In less technical terms, ‘the F is G’ can be assigned a classical
truth value only if there is a unique F. And so, treating the definite determiner as a
quantificational determiner, viz. typing it as a function from two predicate sets to a
truth value, we can represent this presuppositional requirement formally as in (16).10
(16) JtheK = P:∃!xP(x). Q. ∃x[P(x) ∧ ∀y[P(y) → x = y] ∧ Q(x)] ⟨et,⟨et,t⟩⟩
The expression ∃!xP(x) is to be understood as a restriction on the initial -function.
The domain of this function is the set of predicates of type ⟨e,t⟩ (i.e. a set of sets
of individuals) but it is defined only for arguments (i.e. sets of individuals) that have
exactly one member. This condition could thus also have been stated as a cardinality
10 On this analysis, the definite determiner is of type (O3), i.e. ‘the’ both presupposes and
asserts existence. I begin by considering this lexical entry in order to highlight that a
presuppositional analysis in itself is insufficient for solving the existence problem.
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constraint, e.g. ⌜P: ∣P∣=1⌝. The presuppositional nature of a definite description is
captured in the sense that unless the restrictor set contains precisely one individual,
the semantic computation of the sentence crashes. As a crude illustration, consider
(17) and (18).
(17) S
qqq
qqq
q
VVVVV
VVVVV
VVV
DP
crash
qqq
qqq
q
MMM
MMM
M VP
D NP
qqq
qqq
q
MMM
MMM
M V
the
(det.)
king of France
(restrictor)
is bald
(nuclear scope)
(18) S
qqq
qqq
q
VVVVV
VVVVV
VVV
DP
qqq
qqq
q
MMM
MMM
M VP
D NP
qqq
qqq
q
MMM
MMM
M V
the
(det.)
king of Sweden
(restrictor)
is bald
(nuclear scope)
The restrictor set in (17) is empty and this means that the determiner is undefined
for its restrictor argument. The computation of D+NP therefore fails and as a result
the sentence fails to express a proposition, viz. a truth value cannot be computed
for the sentence as a whole. In contrast, the restrictor set in (18) contains exactly
one individual which means that the computation of D+NP succeeds and that the
sentence as a whole can be assigned a truth value. What the lexical entry in (16)
achieves is thus to impose the requirement on computations of definite descriptions
that only if a unique individual satisfying the restrictor of the description exists will
the sentence as a whole express a proposition. In other words, for a sentence such as
‘the F is G’ to express a proposition, it is a precondition that a unique F exists.
However, we can now see why adopting a presuppositional analysis in and of itself
is not sufficient for solving the existence problem. This becomes particularly clear
when we consider the truth conditions generated by a computation of (18).
[[P:∃!xP(x). Q. ∃x[P(x) ∧ ∀y[P(y) → x = y] ∧ Q(x)]](z.KoS(z))]
(v.bald(v))⇒ [Q. ∃x[KoS(x) ∧ ∀y[KoS(y) → x = y] ∧ Q(x)]](z.bald(z))⇒ ∃x[KoS(x) ∧ ∀y[KoS(y) → x = y] ∧ bald(x)] (18′)
The truth conditions in (18′) are identical to the truth conditions predicted by a
standard Russellian analysis. In other words, if (18′) is embedded under an attitude
verb or in the antecedent of a conditional, we will make the same problematic
predictions that Russell’s analysis was previously shown to make.
It is now clear that the lexical entry in (16) — and more generally any analysis
on which existence ends up being asserted—will invariably retain the prediction that
for e.g. (3) to be true, Hans must desire that there is a ghost in his attic and this was
of course the prediction we were aiming to avoid. The upshot is this: Using partial
functions to ensure that the existence of a unique F is a constraint on use is not, in
10 | e Existence Problem
itself, sufficient for solving the existence problem. The analysis must also ensure that
existence does not end up being asserted.
In conclusion, if the solution to the existence problem must rely on an analysis
which distinguishes the meaning of an existential-there sentence such as (9) from the
meaning of a sentence with a definite description in subject position such as (8), and if
this is best achieved by a presuppositional analysis, then only a purely presuppositional
analysis in the sense of (O2) above can work. If existence presuppositions are
captured in terms of partial functions, viz. in terms of partial interpretability,
the challenge is how to formally characterize the asserted content without using
expressions that assert existence.
Presuppositions and Referential Terms: The Frege/Strawson Analysis
On the so-called Frege/Strawson analysis of definite descriptions, definite descrip-
tions are not only assumed to trigger existence presuppositions, i.e. assumed to be
constrained in their use to contexts where it is common ground that there is a unique
individual satisfying the restrictor, but also assumed to be referential. Expressions of
the form ‘the F’ are thus assumed to refer to the unique individual who is F. This is
typically captured formally using a lexical entry such as the following.11
(19) JtheK = P:∃!xP(x). xP(x) ⟨et,e⟩
Here the definite determiner is treated as a function from properties to individuals
but again the function is partial: it is defined only for arguments (sets of individuals)
whose cardinality equals one. The complex -expression is a referential term which
refers to the unique member of the restrictor set F. Hence, a computation of the
semantic value of the determiner and its argument can succeed only if the argument
(the relevant set of individuals) has exactly one member. If the function is defined
for its argument, the resulting -expression is effectively a constant which refers to
this individual. Given this lexical entry, a computation of (18) now yields the truth
conditions stated in (18′′).
[y. bald(y)]([P:∃!xP(x). xP(x)](z.KoS(z)))⇒ [y. bald(y)](xKoS(x))⇒ bald(xKoS(x)) (18′′)
What is important to notice is that (18′′) does not assert that a unique individual
who is a king of Sweden exists and that this individual is bald. Instead, (18′′)
11 This (or notational variants) is standard in contemporary semantics, see e.g. Elbourne
(2005), von Fintel and Heim (2007), Heim and Kratzer (1998), Schwarz (2009). In
some cases the lexical entries are embedded in an intensional situation semantics and thus
amended to contain -abstractions over situation variables. This makes no difference to the
points pursued here. It should also be emphasized that a referential treatment in this sense
is compatible with an analysis of the definite determiner where it is typed (semantically) as
a quantificational determiner, JtheK = P:∃!xP(x). Q. Q(xP(x)).
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asserts of the individual who is the unique king of Sweden that this individual is
bald. This means that when this formula is embedded under an attitude verb, the
existence problem should simply fail to arise. Similarly, in cases where a definite
description is embedded in the antecedent of a conditional, e.g. (12), the prediction
is that the conditional as a whole presupposes the existence of a French king. If this
presupposition is satisfied, the antecedent of the conditional will simply contain a
referential term referring to this individual (whoever it may be) and the semantic
value of the conditional can then be unproblematically computed (according to
whatever semantic analysis of conditionals one might favor). In sum, presupposing
existence and treating the asserted content of the description as a referential term
allows one to effectively mimic the result of wide-scoping without relying on any
dubious syntactic assumptions. Moreover, one can now straightforwardly explain
the contrast noted earlier between (14) and (15) (repeated below).
(14) #I’m not sure there are any ghosts in my attic. If the ghost in my attic is quiet
tonight, I might finish my thesis.
(15) I’m not sure there are any ghosts in my attic. If there is a unique ghost in my
attic and it is quiet tonight, I might finish my thesis.
An assertion of (12) is felicitous only if it is common ground that there is a unique
ghost in the speaker’s attic. Hence, if the speaker declares herself agnostic as to
whether this is common ground, it is infelicitous for her to assert the sentence. This
is the reason that (14) sounds contradictory. On the other hand, asserting (15) is
acceptable simply because this sentence contains no presuppositional expressions and
therefore have no restrictions imposed on its use.
Since the Frege/Strawson analysis appears to provide a simple and intuitive
resolution of the existence problem, Heim (1991) and Elbourne (2005; 2010) both
take the existence problem as providing evidence that the Frege/Strawson analysis
is the correct analysis of definite descriptions. However, one more important
assumption is needed if this solution is to work for non-denoting descriptions too.
Presupposition Projection in Attitude Contexts
On the Frege/Strawson analysis, the existence problem now fails to arise in cases
where the definite description in fact refers, but the original problem case remains
problematic.
(3) Hans wants the ghost in his attic to be quiet tonight.
Since there are no ghosts, the computation of the complement clause of (3) crashes.
The problem is that the Frege/Strawson analysis predicts that an utterance of a
sentence such as (3) presupposes that there is a unique ghost and this prediction
seems intuitively incorrect. It seems more natural to think that (3) only presupposes
that Hans believes that there is a ghost. In fact, it seems that when a presuppositional
expression occurs inside the scope of an attitude verb, the constraint that it generally
imposes on its use is different from the constraint imposed in standard non-
intensional contexts.
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This behavior of presuppositional expressions was first emphasized by Karttunen
(1974) who concluded that when presuppositions are triggered in the scope of a non-
factive attitude verb, the presuppositions project into belief contexts. That is, while an
assertion of (20) triggers the presupposition that Sue smoked — and hence requires
that this is common ground — this is not so for (21).
(20) Sue stopped smoking.
(21) Bertrand
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
hopes
believes
wishes
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎭ that Sue stopped smoking.
(21) only presupposes that Bertrand believes that Sue smoked. To see this, we need
only observe that it is infelicitous for a speaker to continue an utterance of (20) by
uttering (22a-22b) whereas these continuations are perfectly felicitous for (21).
(22) a. # However, I’m not sure she ever smoked.
b. # But she never smoked.
The presupposition triggered by (21) is not that Sue smoked but instead that the
subject of the attitude, Bertrand, believes that she smoked. The discourse participants
must mutually accept this doxastic claim in order for an utterance of (21) to be
felicitous.12
When Karttunen’s generalization is accepted, (3) is not predicted to presuppose
that there is a unique ghost in Hans’ attic. Rather, it is predicted to presuppose that
Hans believes that there is. And since the definite description in (3) is analyzed as
a referential term (which simply refers to the individual that Hans believes exists),
the analysis is now in a position to predict that (3) has a true interpretation without
incurring any unfortunate assertions of existence.13
12 This generalization is further supported by the infelicity of utterances such as (i) and (ii)
below.
(i) # Bertrand hopes that Sue stops smoking but believes she never smoked.
(ii) # Bertrand wants Sue to stop smoking but he’s not sure she ever smoked.
I should emphasize that how presuppositions project in attitude contexts is a rather
complicated issue that I will discuss in more detail in section 3.3.
13 Strictly speaking, this prediction requires both a suitable semantics for propositional attitude
verbs and an account of the behavior of presuppositions in attitude contexts, see e.g. Heim
(1992) for a thorough discussion. I discuss some of these problems briefly in later sections.
However, if for example one accepts Karttunen’s generalization and adopts Heim’s (1992)
ordering semantics for desire-verbs, this should suffice for making correct predictions in
cases such as (3).
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Interim Conclusion
The Frege/Strawson analysis might seem to completely resolve the existence prob-
lem, but I now intend to demonstrate that sentences such as (3) and (12) are simple
instances of a thoroughly general problem concerning the existence commitments
incurred by natural language determiners. While the Frege/Strawson analysis is
in a position to make correct predictions for cases involving definite descriptions
(when combined with the aforementioned auxiliary assumptions), this result relies
on exploiting a particular feature of the meaning of definite descriptions — a feature
that cannot be exploited in cases involving various other determiners. When this is
acknowledged, it becomes clear that the Frege/Strawson analysis fails to get to the
heart of the existence problem. It also becomes clear that muchmore radical changes
to our semantic system are needed, if a proper semantic analysis of the existence
commitments incurred by various natural language determiners is to be devised.
2.3 Indefinite Descriptions: The Failure of the Referential Analysis
Consider this simple scenario.
Context I Suppose that three knownmurderers are on trial for their crimes and suppose
that Bertrand has a desire that at least one of the three murderers be
convicted. Now, let’s assume that Bertrand has no specific individual in mind;
if either of the three murderers are convicted, Bertrand’s desire is satisfied.
For example, suppose that Bertrand has a bet that at least one murderer
will be convicted. But, let’s also assume that Bertrand is a normal and
rational individual who prefers thatmurders were never committed. Bertrand
therefore has no desire that there be a murderer. His desire that a murderer
be convicted is conditional on the antecedent belief that the individuals on
trial are in fact murderers. Now suppose, on the night of the trial, I report
this by uttering (23). (CI)
(23) Bertrand wants a murderer to be convicted tonight.
In the scenario described in (CI) my utterance of (23) is clearly both felicitous and
true. But a familiar problem now resurfaces: On the standard (Russellian) analysis
of indefinite descriptions, i.e. ‘an F’ or ‘some F’, these descriptions are analyzed
as complex quantificational constructions. Since the indefinite description interacts
with a modal (the propositional attitude verb), (23) has both a narrow scope (de dicto)
interpretation and a wide scope (de re) interpretation.
(23) a. DESb[∃x[murderer(x) ∧ convicted(x)]]
On the narrow scope analysis above, the standard Russellian analysis predicts that
(23) is true only if Bertrand desires the truth of the following conjunction: There
is a murderer and he is convicted. However, this is directly inconsistent with the
scenario described in (CI) — Bertrand has no desire that there is a murderer.
But the wide scope reading in (23b) makes an equally problematic prediction.
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(23) b. ∃x[murderer(x) ∧ DESb[convicted(x)]]
The prediction here is that (23) is true only if there is a murderer and Bertrand wants
that murderer to be convicted. This is problematic for two different reasons: First,
the truth of (23) does not in fact require that there is a murderer. The scenario
could have been described so that the existence of murderers was nothing but a
figment of Bertrand’s imagination and yet (23) could be true. Second, Bertrand is
now predicted to entertain a de re desire about a particular individual, but this is
inconsistent with the scenario described in (CI). Bertrand has no desire pertaining
to any specific murderer, because he does not care which murderer is convicted.14
The analogy between (23) and (3) is striking. In both cases, permutations of the
scope taking expressions yield incorrect truth conditions and in both cases there is
a strong intuition that existence is not asserted and hence not part of the attitudinal
content. Instead it seems that in both cases existence is presupposed. In other words,
(23), (3) and also (12), are instances of the same (existence) problem. For example,
notice that the problem with indefinites, as manifested by (23), can also arise in con-
ditionals. Consider the following scenario.
Context II Mary wants an apple pie for her birthday tomorrow and so she asks Bertrand
if he would help bake one. While Bertrand is happy to help, Mary suddenly
realizes that the stores are closed and that she is unsure whether they have
the required ingredients. Now suppose Bertrand utters (24). (CII)
(24) I know we have flour, sugar, cinnamon, and nutmeg. If some apples in the
pantry are ripe, we should be alright.
Here it seems incorrect to analyze the indefinite description in the conditional in
(24) as asserting the existence of apples in the pantry; Bertrand is not making the
hypothetical claim that if there are some apples in the pantry and they are ripe, they can
then bake the pie. Bertrand seems to be presupposing that there are apples in the
pantry. Too see this, observe the contrast in judgments about the following sentences.
(25) # I know we have flour, sugar, cinnamon, and nutmeg, but I’m not sure we
have any apples. If some apples in the pantry are ripe, we should be alright.
(26) I know we have flour, sugar, cinnamon, and nutmeg, but I’m not sure we
have any apples. If there are some apples in the pantry and they are ripe,
we should be alright.15
14 I believe Hawthorne and Manley (2012) were the first to observe that the existence
problem generalizes to other determiners, and they also take this to be an argument against
the Frege/Strawson solution to the existence problem. However, in the most recent
draft (available to me), they suggest an alternative analysis that arguably makes incorrect
predictions for both definites and indefinites. This is demonstrated in section 2.4.
15 These cases are variants of cases discussed in von Fintel (1998). There, von Fintel presents a
number of cases suggesting that weak determiners do, on occasion, trigger presuppositions.
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(CII) shows that the existence problem can also arise with indefinite descriptions
when these are embedded in conditionals and even if the consequences of treating
the description in (24) as asserting existence leads to somewhat less problematic
predictions than in the case of (12), it seems clear that this is not the correct analysis.
When we acknowledge that the existence problem can arise with indefinite
descriptions, it is easy to see that it can also arise withmany other determiner phrases,
e.g. numerical determiners such as ‘three Fs’, ‘exactly six Fs’ etc. In other words, the
existence problem raises a general problem for more or less every determiner phrase
— not just definite descriptions. And because of the general nature of the existence
problem, it can now easily be demonstrated that the Frege/Strawson solution fails to
get to the core of the existence problem.
On the Frege/Strawson analysis, ‘the F’ is analyzed as referential rather than
quantificational and this is a feasible assumption with respect to definite descriptions
simply because these descriptions pick out a unique individual. One can thus more
or less unproblematically assume that a definite description refers to the unique
individual who happens to satisfy the description. The advantage is that when the
meaning of a definite description is treated as a referential term, one can embed the
description inside the scope of an attitude verb or a conditional without incurring
any existence problems.
However, this solution to the existence problem is simply exploiting the unique-
ness of definite descriptions and for this reason, it cannot be extended to cases such as
(23) or (24). Even if we assume that the indefinite description in (23) does not assert,
but rather presupposes, the existence of a murderer (as immediate intuitions might
suggest), we cannot analyze the asserted content of the description as a referential
term for the following reasons: There are several murderers in the context, i.e. there
is no unique murderer in the context, so if the indefinite ‘a murderer’ is analyzed
as a referential term, which individual is this referential term supposed to pick
out? Moreover, if the indefinite description is analyzed as a referential term, we
would predict that Bertrand has a desire about a specific murderer which is directly
inconsistent with the scenario described in CI. In CI, Bertrand’s desire is satisfied
regardless of which murderer is convicted and in order to capture this, we must
allow the indefinite description to range over multiple individuals, i.e. we must treat
the indefinite description as a genuine quantificational expression. Any referential
analysis of indefinite descriptions is thus by its very definition incapable of capturing
that Bertrand’s desire is general rather than specific.
In conclusion, the strategy underlying the Frege/Strawson solution to the ex-
istence problem, i.e. characterizing the asserted content using referential terms, is
incapable of providing a general solution to the existence problem. This strategy
fails because the existence problem generalizes to cases where there is no uniqueness
to exploit and where adequate truth conditions require quantificational force.16 In
16 I should note here that the generalization problem also rules out an analysis on which the
asserted content contains just a universal quantifier ranging over every individual satisfying
the restrictor predicate. As regards definite descriptions, the partial function guarantees
that the predicate set is singleton and as a result, universal quantification over that set in
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sum, the existence problem is a general problem about the existence commitments of
natural language determiners and it seems reasonable to assume that it has a general
solution.
Given the above observations, it seems clear that a general and uniform solution
to the existence problem, viz. a uniform analysis of existence commitments which
is adequate for definites but also indefinites, is going to require significant changes
to our semantic system. Summarizing what we have observed so far helps illustrate
what an adequate semantic analysis of e.g. definite and indefinite descriptions must
look like.
◾ The analysis must be capable of distinguishing existential-there sentences
from sentences with descriptions or determiner phrases in subject position.
This means that the asserted contents cannot invariably be characterized using
expressions which assert existence, i.e. existential quantifiers. As shown in (3)
and (23), when existence is asserted, the problem in question arises.◾ The asserted contents cannot invariably be characterized using referential
terms. If the asserted contents are characterized as such, this yields incorrect
predictions when the descriptions or determiner phrases in question do not
imply uniqueness, cf. (23) and (24).◾ Even if indefinite determiners are analyzed as presuppositional, these must
be analyzed as ranging over multiple individuals. If they are not, this yields
inadequate predictions, cf. (23) and (24).
This raises the following question: Is there any viable way of characterizing what these
descriptions contribute to the asserted content that avoids the existence problem? Or in other
words, is there a viable analysis which can plausibly satisfy each of the conditions
stated above? I think that there is and in the second half of this paper, I outline such
an analysis. However, before proceeding to the positive part of this paper, I want
to first discuss some possible responses on behalf of the proponents of a Russellian
analysis.
2.4 The Vagaries of Attitude Verbs
Despite the rather serious obstacles to solving the existence problem explicated
above, there are various defensive maneuvers that could be made on behalf of
Russell’s analysis (or variants thereof). A proponent of Russell’s theory could for
example attempt to reject the problem by arguing that...
the asserted content would range only over a single individual without incurring existential
commitments. However, for e.g. indefinite descriptions, this strategy fails miserably, since
on such an analysis an utterance of (23) would be predicted to be equivalent to asserting that
Bertrand wants every murderer to be convicted.
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Response 1 The putative problem posed by the existence problem relies on a mistaken
logical assumption, namely that propositional attitude verbs are closed
under logical consequence. Since it is widely known that they are not,
there simply is no problem (and there never were) for Russell’s analysis of
definite and indefinite descriptions. (R1)
Response 2 The putative problem is not the result of an inadequate semantic analysis of
definite or indefinite determiners but rather a result of complexities which
it is well known that propositional attitude verbs introduce. (R2)
Response 3 If a suitably enriched notion of propositions is adopted — a notion on
which propositions are structured entities that mirror the syntax of the
sentences that express those propositions — the existence problem can be
avoided. (R3)
Response 4 The existence problem appears to cause a problem for Russell’s analysis
only because the full range of technical resources at our disposal (technical
resources necessary for dealing with various intensional constructions)
have not yet been utilized. Once these tools are properly utilized, we are
in a position to dispel the puzzle. (R4)
Elbourne (2010) has already convincingly argued that the existence problem does not
rely on the incorrect assumption that propositional attitude verbs are closed under
classical consequence. But since this type of response is frequently voiced, I reiterate
some of Elbourne’s observations here and add a couple of novel ones. This, I hope,
will conclusively disarm responses of type (R1).17
The response in (R1) starts with the following observation: the sentence in (27)
logically entails that there are men, but this logical entailment fails when (27) is
embedded in the scope of an attitude verb, cf. (28).
(27) There are honest men. (Kaplan, 2005)⊧ There are men.
(28) Diogenes wondered whether there are honest men. (Kaplan, 2005)⊭ Diogenes wondered whether there are men.
Examples such as these are supposed to show that propositional attitude verbs are
not closed under a classical consequence relation and from this it is concluded that
from a sentence such as (11), a simple Russellian paraphrase of (3), one cannot infer
(29).
(3) Hans wants the ghost in his attic to be quiet tonight.
(11) Hans wants there to be a unique ghost in his attic and for it to be quiet.
(29) Hans wants there to be a unique ghost in his attic.
17 This response is tentatively endorsed by Kaplan (2005, 985) and emphatically stressed by
Neale (2005, 846, 2007, 89-91). It has also frequently been raised in Q&As when I have
presented this material.
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The problem with this response is that it simply does not address the right ob-
jection.18 The problem for Russell’s analysis raised here is not a problem about
entailments, it is a problem about the predicted truth conditions and the predicted
asserted content. To illustrate, suppose a speaker utters the sentence in (30) but
continues her speech by uttering either (30a) or (30b).19
(30) I am not sure there are any ghosts in my attic.
a. I want there to be exactly one ghost in my attic and for it to be quiet
tonight.
b. # I want the ghost in my attic to be quiet tonight.
As Elbourne rightly points out, the continuation in (30a) is consistently judged
felicitous by native speakers of English whereas the continuation in (30b) is reported
to sound contradictory and hence infelicitous. The problem here is that if (30a)
is nothing but a paraphrase of (30b), as the proponents of the Russellian analysis
maintain, both of these discourse continuations should be felicitous — yet they are
not. This means that if the type of response given in (R1) is to be relevant to the
objection raised here, it must be reformulated, i.e. it should be,
[...] the superficially similar but ultimately distinct claim that the utterance of
[(30a)] is consistent with [me] being unsure that there is a ghost in [my] attic,
whereas the utterance of [(30b)] is not. But [(30a)] is just a Russellian paraphrase
of [(30b)]. So the Russellian paraphrase cannot be correct. (Elbourne, 2010, 6)
In other words, there are strong reasons to believe that the meaning of the com-
plement clause of (30a) cannot be equivalent in meaning to the complement of
(30b). And so, even if we assume that propositional attitude verbs are not closed
under classical consequence, this cannot explain why the truth conditions predicted by
Russell’s analysis for sentences such as (3) are intuitively incorrect.
The response in (R2) is a more general version of (R1) and the primary problem
with this response (and also withR1) is that the existence problem is not restricted to
cases where a determiner phrase is embedded in the scope of a propositional attitude
verb. As has already been emphasized several times, the exact same type of problem
arises with conditionals.
Moreover, if the existence problem is simply blamed on the complexities of
propositional attitude ascriptions, it would effectively be impossible to construct an
adequate semantics for various attitude verbs — at least if the semantics of definite
18 Moreover, whether the assumption that propositional attitudes are not closed under a
classical consequence relation suffices to show that inferences from (11) to (29) are illicit
is not completely obvious. The fact that classical entailments are not consistently preserved
in propositional attitude contexts does not justify the conclusion that such inferences are
never licensed. Ultimately, that seems to depend on what the “correct” closure conditions
for attitude verbs are. Without any explicit contextual clues, if some speaker were to assert
the sentence in (11), it would not seem unreasonable for an interlocutor to infer (29).
19 This argument is due to Elbourne (2010, 6) — slightly modified here.
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descriptions is assumed to be the standard Russellian semantics. First, remember
that the Russellian analysis is incapable of distinguishing the meanings, viz. the truth
conditions, of (8) and (9) (repeated below).
(8) The ghost is quiet.
(9) There is a unique ghost and it is quiet.
Suppose, as is standard, that attitude verbs take propositions as their arguments.
Now, if an attitude verb  takes as its argument a proposition p, we need (p) to
output one set of truth conditions when p is the proposition expressed by (8) and to
output a distinct set of truth conditions when p is the proposition expressed by (9).
But since (8) and (9) have the same truth conditions on the Russellian analysis and
thus express the same proposition, it seems that we need  to take identical arguments
and systematically output distinct truth conditions. It is rather difficult to envision how
this is supposed to be possible. And again, this simply highlights the importance
of adopting a semantic analysis which can distinguish the meaning of (8) from the
meaning of (9).
But what if we could assume that (8) and (9) do not express the same proposition
and yet retain the Russellian semantics? Proponents of (R3) might propose the
following: Suppose that propositions are structured entities and that their structure
mirrors the syntax of the sentences used to express them. Suppose further that
one can coherently bear an attitude to a proposition  and not bear that attitude
to another proposition  even if  and  are necessarily, or definitionally, equivalent
(and thus have the exact same truth conditions). Now, given that sentences of
the form ‘there is a unique F and it is G’ and ‘the F is G’ have different syntactic
structures, we can maintain that they express different propositions even if the
propositions expressed are necessarily, or definitionally, equivalent. Hence, we can
now also maintain that one can coherently desire the latter without also desiring the
former, and so, the existence problem simply fails to arise.20
For diehard Russellians, this type of response seems to me to be the most
promising. Nevertheless, it comes with certain non-trivial commitments and it also
faces a couple of problems. First, the viability of the Russellian semantics for definite
descriptions now depends on adopting (a) a specific view of propositions (which
would have to be quite comprehensive) and (b) a particular conception of natural
language syntax (in which propositional structure is cashed out), see e.g. King (2007).
This is not in itself problematic, but since there are multiple notions of propositions
and multiple different approaches to natural language syntax (that one might favor
for various purposes), this seems like a cost. Second, this kind of view would need to
be supplemented with an explanation of the contrast between (30a) and (30b) above.
If definite descriptions are Russellian, this contrast cannot be explained in terms of
the semantics. A third worry is that since this view effectively solves the existence
problem by making certain assumptions about the nature of propositions, it is not
20 I thank an anonymous referee at Noûs for bringing this view to my attention. I also thank
the referee for noting one of the challenges for this view.
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clear how this would alleviate the problem as it arises in conditionals, cf. (12)-(13)
above. In conditional cases, having different (but necessarily equivalent) propositions
expressed is not obviously going to help avoid the problematic predictions. Similarly,
it is unclear how such structured propositions would help solve the existence problem
as it arises with indefinites. The problem with indefinites is that in some cases where
‘an F is G’ is embedded under ‘want’, it seems that the indefinite must be analyzed
as asserting existence, but in other cases, e.g. (23), it seems that the indefinite must
be analyzed as not asserting existence. Yet, in both cases the syntactic structure of
the sentences is the same. And so, since propositions are distinguished in terms of
syntactic structures and since there is no relevant syntactic difference, two different
propositions cannot be identified. As a result, these cases cannot be explained along
the same lines as cases involving existential-there sentences and definite descriptions.
In conclusion, it is not clear that this fine-grained notion of propositions is going
to be enough to provide a general solution to the existence problem.
The rough idea behind (R4) is roughly this: Suppose we assume a Kratzerian
(1977; 1981) semantics for modals where modals are quantifiers over possible worlds
and modal statements depend on conversational backgrounds, namely modal bases
and ordering sources. Moreover, let’s also assume that a sentence such as DESa()
is true only if at the worlds determined by the modal base, the best ranked worlds
are -worlds (where the rank of these worlds is determined by the ordering source).
Following Heim (1992), we can assume that the modal base for DES depends on
the subject of the attitude verb and that in (3) the modal base is the doxastic state
of the subject, i.e. a set of worlds compatible with the beliefs of the subject. This
set of worlds is then ordered according to the ordering source which is the subject’s
desires.
This is supposed to yield the following truth conditions: (3) is true if and only if
the best ranked worlds (determined by the modal base and the ordering source) are
such that the formula embedded inside the scope of the attitude verb in (4) is true at
those worlds.
(4) DESh[∃x[ghost-in-attic(x) ∧ ∀y[ghost-in-attic(y) → x = y] ∧ quiet(x)]]
And so, if the modal base is determined on the basis of Hans’ beliefs, every world in
the modal base will be a world where there is exactly one ghost in Hans’ attic. And
the best ranked worlds will be worlds where that ghost is quiet. These appear to be
the correct truth conditions.
Unfortunately, this proposed analysis leaves one crucial question unanswered: In
virtue of what is the set of relevant worlds restricted to include only worlds where
there is exactly one ghost in Hans’ attic? If one simply assumes that the modal base
is Hans’ doxastic states, then the question is this: Where in (3) do we locate the
information thatHans believes that there is a ghost in his attic? It is difficult to see how
one could plausibly answer this question without appealing to some presuppositional
requirement triggered by the sentence itself. Or to state the worry differently, it
remains thoroughly unclear what the role of the existential quantifier in (4) is. Since
the formula in (4) expresses exactly the predicted truth conditions of (11) (repeated
below), how are we supposed to predict that the truth conditions of (11) are distinct
from the truth conditions of (3)?
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(3) Hans wants the ghost in his attic to be quiet tonight.
(11) Hans wants there to be a unique ghost in his attic and for it to be quiet.
Again, the problem is the Russellian analysis’ inability to distinguish existential-there
sentences from sentences with a definite description in subject position. Finally, on
this analysis, it is not clear how to explain the contrast exhibited by (30a) and (30b).
But now an alternative analysis might seem to suggest itself. Suppose we assume
that ‘the F is G’ both presupposes and asserts existence. That is, we assume that uses
of ‘the F’ imposes the requirement that it is common ground that there is a unique
F, but it also asserts that there is a unique F. This would not really be a Russellian
view, but it might be close enough. Would this amendment now solve the problems
mentioned for the analysis above? It might seem so: If ‘the F is G’ triggers the
presupposition that there is a unique F, we can now explain why the set of relevant
worlds, in the case above, would only include worlds where there is a ghost — (3) is
only felicitous if there is a ghost at each of Hans’ doxastic alternatives. Moreover,
by adding the presuppositional constraint, we can now also explain contrasts such as
that between (30a) and (30b). So, this proposal combined with the analysis of attitude
verbs sketched above looks like it might get the truth conditions right for both the
problematic attitude cases and the conditional cases. Nevertheless, I think that this
suggested analysis still faces a serious problem.21
With this analysis we can now distinguish between (3) and (11) in the sense
that the former comes with a presuppositional requirement that the latter does not.
However, (3) and (11) have the same asserted content, and so when the presupposition
is satisfied (e.g. common ground), these sentences are going to be true at exactly the
same worlds. But this seems incorrect to me. Let me attempt to illustrate. Suppose S
asserts (31) and then continues to assert either (31a) or (31b). Moreover, let’s assume
that the assertion of (31) is immediately accepted by all of the discourse participants.
(31) There is a unique F ...
a. ... and I want there to be a unique F and for it to be G.22
b. ... and I want the F to be G.
It seems clear that depending on the continuation, S expresses different desires, viz.
the desire expressed by (31a) is not the desire expressed by (31b). However, on the
analysis suggested above, these cannot be distinguished. Here is why: After the
21 This is the view defended by Hawthorne and Manley (2012) and the problem I am about to
sketch for this view is, in its essentials, the problem discussed in section 2.2.1.
22 It seems tome that in general when a speaker says that she wants that , she is implicating that
she does not believe that . So, if this sounds a bit odd to you, try with a slight intonational
stress on ‘want’. Alternatively consider this exhange:
A: My god, is there a carrot in your beer!?
B: Yes, there is a carrot in my beer. And I WANT there to be a carrot in my beer. I like
it that way!
Any felt infelicity is, I think, due to merely pragmatic effects.
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assertion of (31), the presupposition triggered by (31b) is common ground. And
since (31b)’s presupposition is common ground, we can basically ignore that aspect
of its meaning. Given this, what is then asserted by both (31a) and (31b) is (32).
(32) I want: ∃x[F(x) ∧ ∀y[F(y) → x = y] ∧ G(x)]
And given the suggested semantics for ‘want’, both (31a) and (31b) are then predicted
to be true iff for each of S’s desired worlds, the proposition expressed by the
complement clause of (32) is true at those worlds. But this is not the right result,
because we can easily imagine contexts where (31) is common ground and (31b) is
true, but (31a) is false. I.e. we can easily imagine a context where a speaker would
accept and assert (31)+(31b) but not accept or assert (31)+(31a). Of course, this
problem is just an instance of the very problem we are trying to solve, i.e. even when
there is a unique F, I can want that the F isGwithout wanting that there is a unique F
and that it isG—and this has nothing to do with what I or the discourse participants
are taking for granted. To reiterate a now familiar point, suppose we all know there
is a unique murderer and Hans wants the murderer to be convicted. Even when the
existence of a unique murderer is common ground, viz. we all know it, it sounds quite
odd to report Hans’ desire as in (33).
(33) Hans wants there to be a unique murderer and for him to be convicted.
Only if Hans really does desire that there is a murderer would this seem OK. Yet, in
this context where the presupposition is common ground, (33) is simply what ‘Hans
wants the murderer to be convicted’ is predicted to mean.23
In closing, if we are to capture a difference in meaning between (31a) and (31b), a
presuppositional requirement is not going to be sufficient. We need to characterize
the asserted content of the complement clauses such that their meanings differ.
This concludes my discussion of the existence problem in relation to the Russel-
lian analysis and the Frege/Strawson analysis. I should emphasize that the existence
problem is not a problem only for proponents of these analyses, but also for strictly
speaking non-Russellian analyses, e.g. Szabó (2000), Ludlow and Segal (2004), and
Hawthorne and Manley (2012). Any analysis which maintains that definite or
indefinite descriptions uniformly assert the existence of an individual is subject to
incorrect predictions in both non-doxastic attitude contexts and conditionals.
23 Here is a different worry about this type of analysis. Typically, when a speaker S repeats the
same assertion, the second assertion will seem redundant and infelicitous. And if definite
descriptions both presuppose and assert existence, (ii)-(iii) should just be paraphrases of (i).
Nevertheless, where (i) sounds perfectly fine, (ii)-(iii) sound infelicitous.
(i) There is a unique king of France and the king of France is bald.
(ii) # There is a unique king of France and there is a unique king of France and he’s bald.
(iii) # There is a unique king of France and there is a unique king of France who’s bald.
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The remainder of this paper is now devoted to outlining the requirements that a
solution to the existence problem needs to meet and to sketching an analysis which
succeeds in doing this.
3 Towards a Solution to the Existence Problem
In the previous section, I outlined several conditions for a solution to the existence
problem. After summarizing these conditions, I sketch a semantic analysis of definite
and indefinite descriptions that succeeds in satisfying these conditions. However,
since this proposed analysis is embedded in a dynamic semantic framework, I digress
with a short introduction. After this introduction, I explain how the proposed
analysis provides a solution to the existence problem as it arises in conditionals. I then
move to a discussion of attitude verbs and I demonstrate that my analysis is the way
forward if the existence problem is to be avoided, but I also show that a full-fledged
solution to this problem requires the development of a general dynamic semantics
for attitude verbs and a systematic analysis of anaphora in intensional contexts. Such
a full-fledged solution is unfortunately beyond the scope of this paper.
3.1 Three Desiderata
Here are three minimal conditions which in light of the discussion above it seems an
analysis intended to solve the existence problem must meet.
Condition 1 The analysis must distinguish, or minimally be capable of distinguishing,
the meaning, i.e. the truth conditions, of an existential-there sentences
such as (8) from the meaning of a sentence with a definite or an indefinite
description in subject position such as (9). (C1)
Condition 2 The asserted content of definite and indefinite descriptions cannot be
characterized using quantificational expressions or referential terms (at
least when the descriptions are embedded in the scope of non-doxastic
attitude verbs or in conditionals.) (C2)
Condition 3 If an analysis of indefinite descriptions (and indefinite determiners more
generally) is to be overall adequate, these determiners must be analyzed
as having quantificational force, i.e. as ranging over multiple individuals.
(C3)
It is prima facie difficult to see how any analysis of descriptions could plausibly meet
all of these conditions. And yet, the challenge is not only to devise an analysis which
meets each of these conditions (even though that certainly is a major challenge), the
analysis must also be generally adequate.
Now, the most natural way of satisfying (C1) is to adopt a presuppositional
analysis of not only definite descriptions but also indefinite descriptions. So, let’s ten-
tatively assume that definite descriptions invariably trigger existence presuppositions
and that indefinite descriptions are capable of triggering existence presuppositions.
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This assumption will provide us with the required resources to distinguish between
the meanings of (8) and (9), but also, potentially, the meanings of (34) and (35).24
(34) There are some apples in the pantry and they are ripe.
(35) Some apples in the pantry are ripe.
However, if we assume that the indefinite description in (35) is capable of triggering
an existence presupposition, the crucial question is how we should characterize its
asserted content. The second condition above, (C2), says that the asserted contents
of definite and indefinite descriptions cannot be existentially bound variables or
referential terms (i.e. constants or iota-terms). We saw in the previous section that
these characterizations lead to incorrect predictions. This leaves very few options,
but here is one:What is contributed to a sentence by a definite or a (presuppositional)
indefinite description is simply an unbound variable. If we tentatively make this
assumption, the challenge is to explain how this unbound variable is supposed to be
assigned a semantic value.25
So, let’s suppose that a sentence of the form ‘the F is G’ triggers the existential
presupposition P and asserts A (cf.   below).
 
 the F is G S
 ∃x[F(x) ∧ ∀y[F(y) → x = y]] P
 G(x) A
Again, presuppositions are effectively constraints on interpretability. This means
that S can be felicitously uttered only if its presupposition is satisfied. In other words,
any context in which S is felicitous — and any context in which S is true — must
also be a context in which the presupposition, the existential formula in P , is true.
24 There is ample data, for example the sentences considered with respect to (CII), suggesting
that the sentences in (34) and (35) are not, contrary to popular belief, invariably equivalent
in meaning. And while it is not typically assumed that indefinite descriptions trigger
existence presuppositions, the assumption that they sometimes do has been defended by
several people, e.g. Strawson (1952; 1964), Milsark (1977), Partee (1989), Diesing (1992),
and von Fintel (1998), see also Heim (2010). Understanding when and why indefinites
trigger presuppositions is a complex issue that I for reasons of space am unable to explore
here. For now, I simply adopt this assumption with the justification that it seems intuitively
correct for the cases in question. I refer the suspicious readers to the papers cited above.
See also the appendix in Schoubye (2011).
25 The choice of unbound variables (as what is contributed by descriptions to asserted contents)
is supposed to be motivated by the observation that neither quantificational expressions nor
referential terms will work. However, I do acknoweledge that this does not rule that there
is a better alternative (even if I am not sure what that alternative would be). I discuss this
briefly in subsequent sections. I thank an anonymous referee at Noûs for making this clear.
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This means that, if we could somehow have the seemingly unbound variable in A
be bound by the existential formula in P , we would essentially be able to mimic the
effects of wide-scoping the descriptions without making any illicit assumptions about
movement of syntactic constituents (since the presuppositions would not be treated
as proper syntactic constituents). This then provides at least the outline of an analysis
which straightforwardly and elegantly satisfies (C1)-(C3). And if this idea could be
adequately explicated, this should pave the way for a general solution the existence
problem.
Luckily, there are many well-developed semantic frameworks that provide almost
exactly what we need, namely so-called dynamic semantic systems.26 In the next few
subsections, I provide a short introduction to a specific dynamic framework. This
framework will serve as background for the remaining discussion. I then introduce
a dynamic analysis of definite and indefinite descriptions which, as I demonstrate,
satisfy the three conditions described above.
3.2 Meaning as Update Potentials
Following Stalnaker (1970; 1974; 1998; 2002), let’s assume that a discourse context is
a set of possible worlds, the context set, where this set of worlds represents themutually
accepted presuppositions of the discourse participants, what Stalnaker calls the
common ground. For example, if the discourse participants mutually presuppose that
, the context set will contain only -worlds, whereas if the discourse participants
are agnostic or disagree about , the context set will contain both -worlds and¬-worlds. Hence, if  is asserted in a discourse and accepted by the discourse
participants, every ¬-world is eliminated from the context set.
The principal difference between dynamic semantics and standard static seman-
tics is that on the dynamic view the meaning of a sentence is not given by its truth
conditions but instead by its update potential, viz. its potential effect on a discourse.
For example, in Irene Heim’s (1983) influential implementation, sentence meaning
is explicated in terms of context change potentials (CCPs) which informally speaking
are instructions to update the current discourse context to a new revised discourse
context, and formally speaking a set theoretic operation. I.e. updating a discourse
context c with an atomic sentence S is formally to intersect the context set c with the
set of worlds denoted by the proposition expressed by S. This set theoretic operation
eliminates from the context set every world where the proposition expressed by S is
not true.
The update operation for atomic sentences is however constrained by the
condition that if S triggers a presupposition , an update of c with S is defined only if
c entails — if the presuppositions of S are not entailed by c, the update is undefined.
26 I use the term ‘dynamic semantics’ as an umbrella term for various types of semantic
systems which share certain non-standard features, most prominently the permissibility
of binding across clause-boundaries, i.e. Discourse Representation Theory (Kamp, 1981;
Kamp and Reyle, 1993), File Change Semantics (Heim, 1982), and Dynamic Predicate
Logic (Groenendijk and Stokhof, 1991).
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For complex sentences , their CCPs are compositionally derived from the CCPs
of their constituents. Furthermore, when updating a context with a complex sentence
, the update proceeds in increments, one constituent at a time, and requires that
each constituent of  is admitted by its corresponding local context. This means that
updating with a conjunction ∧ requires that c updated with , c[], is defined and
that the resulting context, c’, updated with  is also defined, c’[ ]. The local context
for  is thus c, whereas the local context for  is c[]. In contrast, the global context
for  is simply c. The figure below demonstrates how the CCPs of some additional
complex sentences can be defined.
 
 c[p] c ∩ {w ∣ w ∈ p}
 c[¬] c / c[]
 c[ ∧  ] c[][ ]
 c[ →  ] c / (c[] / c[][ ])
A central feature of Heim’s (1982) system is that indefinites are not treated as
quantificational expressions but instead assumed to introduce new so-called discourse
referents into a discourse. Heim describes the discourse context as a collection of “file
cards” that represent the introduced discourse referents and these file cards contain
information related to the discourse referents. When a sentence containing an
indefinite description is asserted in a context, the context is updated by adding a new
file card and writing the index (i.e. the number) of the indefinite on the card. The file
card now represents this particular discourse referent and future occurrences of the
index will be anaphorically linked to this discourse referent. Indefinite descriptions
are thus formally analyzed as variables whose values depend on a model.
In contrast, if a sentence contains a definite NP (i.e. a pronoun), the information
associated with the definite must be added to an already existing file card, namely
the card whose index corresponds to the index of the definite. Uses of definite NPs
require that theNP, inHeim’s terminology, is familiar (that it has a file card associated
with it) whereas uses of indefinite NPs require the opposite. This essentially means
that definite NPs (NPs with a +def feature) are analyzed as anaphors which are bound
by a previously introduced discourse referent.
Dynamic Semantics
In formal terms, Heim’s file card metaphor is explicated using variable-assignments.
So, instead of treating contexts as simple sets of worlds, we define contexts as sets of
pairs of worlds and variable assignments.27 But first some basic structure.
27 Here I follow loosely the exposition of Heim’s system as it is presented in Roberts (2003,
309-310).
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(A1) A modelM = ⟨W , D, I⟩: whereW is a set of worlds, D is a set of individuals,
and I is an interpretation function from basic expressions to functions from
worlds to extensions.
(A2) Let N be the set of natural numbers and G be a set of assignment functions g
such that g: N z→ D.
(A3) Let Dom be the set of discourse referents introduced into a discourse with
Dom ⊆ N and let Dom(g) denote the domain of an assignment function g.
We can now define a context c (relative to our modelM) as a set of ordered pairs⟨w,g⟩.
(A4) c ⊆ W×G such that c = {⟨w,g⟩ : ∀i ∈ Dom(g), g(i) is an individual which in w
verifies all the information shared by the interlocutors about i.}
To illustrate how contexts, or information states, are updated, suppose we want to
update a context c with the sentence in (36), analyzed as (36a).
(36) A cat arrived.
a. cat(xi−) ∧ arrived(xi+)
Indefinite NPs are assumed to introduce new discourse referents into the discourse,
so updating with the first conjunct of (36a) requires that the domain of discourse,
Dom, is expanded to include i. This can be captured as follows.
(37)
JF(xi−)K = c: c ⊆ {⟨w,g⟩: i ∉ Dom(g)} .
{⟨w′,g′⟩: ∃⟨w,g⟩ ∈ c where g′ is just like g except
that i ∈ Dom(g′) and g′(i) ∈ F(w′) and w′ = w}
In natural language, (37) is a partial function from a context c into a new context c′
which is defined only if the numerical index on the indefinite is not already included
in the domain of the variable assignments. If defined, the function maps the current
context c into a new context c′ where the domain of discourse is extended to include i,
and gmaps i to an individual who is a member of the set F at all worlds of the context.
This captures that indefinite NPs introduce new discourse referents, i.e. that a new
file card must be opened. In formal terms, this simply means that the domain of the
variable assignments in the context is extended to include the relevant index, i.e. the
domain of discourse is expanded. Updating c with the first conjunct of (36) thus yields
a set of worlds w where there is at least one cat at each w. This is thus equivalent to
adding the information, or the proposition, to the context that there is a cat.
In order to interpret the second conjunct, we need an update rule for variables
with the +def feature, i.e.
(38) JF(xi+)K = c: c ⊆ {⟨w,g⟩: i ∈ Dom(g)} . {⟨w,g⟩: g(i) ∈ F(w)}
Since definite NPs require that their referents are familiar, viz. antecedently intro-
duced into the discourse, (38) is treated as a partial function that is defined only if
for every world-variable assignment pair in the context, the domain of the variable
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assignment includes the numerical index i. If defined, the update instruction is simply
to eliminate every world/variable assignment pair from the context that fails to verify
the relevant conditions on g(i). I.e. every world w where g(i) is not in F at wmust be
eliminated from c. Updating c with the second conjunct of (36) thus yields a set of
worlds where the individual i, who is a member of the set of cats, is also a member
of the set of individuals who arrived.28
Presuppositional Definites
In Heim’s system, updating a context with a sentence of the form ‘the F is G’ does
not require that the referent of the F is the unique F, i.e. that there are no other
individuals who are F. However, I propose, for reasons to be explained, to treat ‘the
F’ as imposing the additional requirement that no other individual in the relevant
context is F.29
We are now in a position to define a CCP for sentences of the form ‘the F is G’,
a CCP that captures the constraints outlined in conditions (C1)-(C3) above.30
(39) J[The F]i is GK = c: c ⊆ {⟨w,g⟩: ∣F(w)∣ = 1 ∧ g(i) ∈ F(w)} .c ∩ {⟨w,g⟩: g(i) ∈ G(w)}
28 As the CCP is defined in (38), it imposes the same constraint on every definite NP. But,
it is clear that different definite NPs impose different further requirements on a discourse
context; pronouns impose the semantic constraint that the intended referent satisfies the
number, gender, and person features of the pronoun (the so-called phi-features) and definite
descriptions impose the semantic constraint that their referents satisfy the descriptive
content. And there are arguably more important differences between pronouns and definite
descriptions, for example how salient their intended referents must be. This is an issue
largely ignored in this paper, but for illuminating discussion, see Roberts (2003). It does
however raise the following question: how should these additional features be formally
captured? For example, must such features be assumed to be given at logical form (similar
to the +def feature)? These are difficult questions and to avoid an excessive and possibly
exegetical discussion about logical forms, I henceforth make the simplifying assumption
that occurrences of e.g. pronouns and definite descriptions can be distinguished as different
inputs for semantic interpretation, and hence can be assigned different CCPs.
29 Here I am essentially proposing a proper uniqueness constraint on definite descriptions
(rather than Heim’s less strict familiarity-constraint). Whether definite descriptions trigger
uniqueness presuppositions is amuch debated issue, but nothing crucial tomymain points in
this paper depends on this. For arguments in favor of a uniqueness assumption, cf. Roberts
(2003). The purpose of the uniqueness constraint here is to maintain a clear difference
between definite descriptions and presuppositional indefinite descriptions.
30 This CCP is defined at the sentence level and I ignore issues related to its composition. This
is but a convenient short cut, and not something which I believe is in any way problematic.
One could, I suppose, convert (39) into a lexical entry for just the definite determiner
by abstracting over both predicates and this would make it quite similar to the standard
semantics for quantificational determiners (only it would output a  rather than a truth
value). But, I remain agnostic as to what is the most optimal strategy here.
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The CCP in (39) is a partial function that is defined only if the set F has exactly one
member at every world w, and g maps i to that individual at w. If the function is
defined, the context is updated by eliminating every world/variable-assignment pair
where the individual denoted by g(i) is not a member of the set G at w.
The predictions of the CCP proposed in (39) are in standard extensional contexts
more or less equivalent to the predictions of a Frege/Strawson analysis. The CCP in
(39) predicts that an assertion of ‘the F is G’ is felicitous only when it is antecedently
established that there is exactly one individual who is F. This prediction mimics
the predictions of the Frege/Strawson analysis where ‘the F is G’ fails to express
a proposition when the presupposition is not satisfied. When the presupposition is
satisfied, the Frege/Strawson analysis predicts that ‘the F is G’ is true only if the
referent of ‘the F’ is G. On the dynamic analysis, if the update is successful, that
is if the update leaves a non-empty set of world/variable-assignment pairs, then for
each world w in c, the unique individual who is F at w is also G, viz. the same truth
conditions.
Presuppositional Indefinites
We have already seen how indefinite descriptions are generally analyzed in the
Heimian dynamic framework sketched above, namely as expanding the domain of
the variable assignments in c, viz. the domain of discourse. This would also be the
analysis we would employ for sentences with existential-there sentences, i.e. ‘there
is a/some F’. However, now the question is how we should treat the special, and
perhaps less frequent, occurrences of presuppositional indefinite descriptions? Here
I propose a treatment similar to the treatment of definite descriptions but with one
exception: presuppositional uses of indefinite descriptions do not require uniqueness.
Thus, we define the CCP for presuppositional uses of ‘an F is G’ or ‘some F is G’
as follows.
(40) J[Aps/Someps F]i is GK = c: c ⊆ {⟨w,g⟩: ∣F(w)∣ ≥ 1 ∧ g(i) ∈F(w)} . c ∩ {⟨w,g⟩: g(i) ∈ G(w)}
As before, (40) is a partial function that is defined if and only if for every ⟨w,g⟩ in
the context c, F has at least one member at w, and g maps i to an individual who is
F at w. And again, if the function is defined, updating c means eliminating every
world/variable-assignment pair where the individual g(i) at world w is not a member
of the setG atw. This makes presuppositional indefinite descriptions look very much
like definite descriptions, but this is not surprising because they are the same in at
least one sense — both trigger presuppositions. However, they are also importantly
different, because uses of ‘some F is G’ do not presuppose that there is exactly one
individual who is F. This analysis captures this fact.
However, the most important feature of this analysis is that on the presuppo-
sitional interpretation of indefinite descriptions, these do not assert existence. A
presuppositional indefinite description is treated as an anaphor and not as introduc-
ing a new discourse referent. This should be sufficient to avoid the problematic
assertions of existence without assuming that an indefinite description refers to a
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particular individual and yet retaining the quantificational force of the indefinite:
Even though an indefinite description such as ‘an F’ will be anaphorically linked to
a particular discourse referent, this discourse referent can be mapped to different
individuals across the worlds of the context as long as there are multiple individuals
who are F.31
31 An anonymous referee raised the following question: Does the existence problem force to
us to adopt an analysis where the asserted component is analyzed as a variable? I.e. could
we not analyze a sentence such as (1) as having roughly the logical form in (2) instead?
(1) [A murderer] is convicted.
(2) Somethingi is a murderer and [the thing]i is convicted.
As regards presuppositional occurrences of indefinite descriptions, I take it that the idea here
would be to analyze the first conjunct in (2) as the presupposed component and the second
conjunct as the asserted component, cf. (4).
(3) [Apres murderer] is convicted.
(4) P: Somethingi is a murderer. A: [the thing]i is convicted.
With this analysis, the question is how to explicate the meaning of the definite description,
i.e. ‘the thing’. That is, as we attempt to compute the truth conditions for (1) and (3), what
should we assume that ‘the thing’ contributes to these truth conditions? Or in other words,
what do we put in place of the blank lines in (5) and (6).
(5) ∃xi[murderer(xi) ∧ convicted( i)]
(6) P: ∃xi[murderer(xi)] A: convicted( i)
If we assume that ‘the thing’ contributes to the truth conditions of (1) an existentially
quantified formula, i.e. a Russellian definite description, we will make incorrect predictions
in attitude contexts and certain conditionals, i.e. (23) and (24). On the other hand, we
cannot assume that ‘the thing’ contributes a specific individual to the truth conditions of
(1), i.e. that ‘the thing’ is a referential term such as xThing(x), because uniqueness is not
guaranteed — that is, there might be more than one thing in the context. And in cases
where multiple individuals could make the sentence true, a referential analysis is going to
yield incorrect truth conditions, because it will predict that the sentence is true only if one
particular individual is convicted. Since we get incorrect truth conditions when ‘the thing’ is
analyzed as contributing either a quantificational expression or a referential term, what term
of the language used to state the truth conditions should we use? Here, I think, variables
are a natural choice, because these are already part of that language. By using variables,
we immediately avoid problematic assertions of existence. And so, if a proper mechanism
for assigning semantic values to these variables can be identified — i.e. a mechanism that
supplies the proper quantificational force — this then provides exactly what appears to be
needed. And such a mechanism is precisely what the dynamic system described above is
intended to provide.
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Solving the Existence Problem for Conditionals
It should now be fairly straightforward to see that the analysis sketched above solves
the existence problem as it arises in the cases involving conditionals. That is, using
the CCP for ‘the F is G’ given in (39) and the CCP for ‘if ,  ’ given in section 3.2,
the existence problem simply fails to arise. Consider the abbreviated version of (12)
below.
(12) If [the ghost in my attic]i is quiet tonight, then  .
In order to update a context c with a sentence of the form ‘if ,  ’, c[][ ] must be
defined and this means that c[] must also be defined. In this case, since  is ‘the
ghost in my attic is quiet tonight’, c[] is defined only if the following holds:
c ⊆ {⟨w,g⟩: ∣ghost-in-attic(w)∣ = 1 ∧ g(i) ∈ ghost-in-attic(w)}
That is, if the context fails to satisfy this constraint, the computation crashes. And if
satisfied, the update then proceeds by intersecting c with the following set:
{⟨w,g⟩: g(i) ∈ quiet-tonight(w)}
This yields a set of world/variable-assignment pairs where the individual denoted by
g(i) at worldw is a member of the set of ghosts and the set of individuals who are quiet
tonight. Next we update c[] with  and then we take the relevant complements (cf.
the CCP for ‘→’ in  ). This now leaves us with a set of worlds where either
the antecendent is false or the consequent is true.32
We also avoid the prediction that (12) is equivalent in meaning to (13).
(13) If there is a unique ghost in my attic and it is quiet tonight, then  .
The reason is that updating c with (13) will not require that the context satisfies
the constraint described above, because this sentence triggers no existential presup-
position. Once again, this highlights that the lexical entry in (39) is more or less
explanatorily equivalent to the Frege/Strawson analysis of definite descriptions.
The real strength of my proposed analysis is that it works in precisely the same
way with presuppositional uses of indefinite descriptions. The difference lies only
in the presuppositional constraint imposed by definite descriptions on the ingoing
context, viz. that the cardinality of the restrictor set is exactly one. We are therefore in
a position to avoid the existence problem even as it arises with indefinite descriptions,
cf. (24) and we thus have a uniform solution to the existence problem as it arises for
conditionals.
32 This lexical entry for the conditional is thus equivalent to material implication and I do not
mean to suggest that this is an even remotely plausible semantics for conditionals. However,
it suffices for making the point that the lexical entry in (39) resolves the existence problem,
since the mechanism employed to avoid the existence problem here could also be employed
with amore sophisticated analysis of conditionals, e.g. theKratzerian analysis of conditionals
proposed in Heim (1992).
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3.3 Propositional Attitudes
The next question is whether my proposed analysis suffices to make correct predic-
tions in the problematic cases involving propositional attitude ascriptions, e.g. (23)
(repeated below).
(23) Bertrand wants a murderer to be convicted tonight.
I have suggested that the indefinite description embedded inside the scope of the
desire verb in (23) should be treated as triggering an existence presupposition and
given my proposed analysis, this means that it should be analyzed as a variable with a
+def feature, i.e. it should interpreted semantically along the lines suggested in (40).
However, I have also argued in favor of the assumption that presuppositions
triggered in the scope of an attitude verb project, in general, to belief contexts. So, it
would not be correct to assume that a sentence such as (23) requires that a discourse
referent xi who is member of the set of murderers at w has already been introduced
into the context. What is presupposed by (23) is not that there is a murderer, but
that Bertrand believes that there is. So, we might conclude that the logical form of
(23) should look something like (41) and that the context must verify (42) in order
for (41) to be interpretable.
(41) DESb[convicted-tonight(xi+)]
(42) BELb[murderer(xi-)]
So, intuitively, one could for example say that if a context verifies (42), it would
then be a context where there is at least one murderer, xi, at each of the worlds
that are compatible with Bertrand’s beliefs. If this context is then updated with
(41), we should then predict that the update is successful if and only if the worlds
where xi is convicted are among the worlds that Bertrand desire. That is, we cannot
update with (41) if there is some world where xi is convicted and this world is
not among Bertrand’s desired worlds.33 Since the indefinite description is treated
as a +def -variable, we avoid a problematic assertion of existence and since xi is
treated as a discourse referent, this discourse referent can be mapped to different
individuals across Bertrand’s belief worlds. And given that the individual convicted
33 This presupposes that the ordering on the worlds will provide at least a partition of the
worlds into those that are desired and those that are not desired by the subject. But for
this type of semantics to work, i.e. a semantics where desire-claims are evaluated in terms
of doxastic alternatives, the doxastic alternatives must be restricted to rule out various far
fetched epistemic possibilities. Heim (1992) uses a similarity relation to do this and we
could in principle do the same. There are more complex cases which might require further
modifications, so I acknowledge that the semantics sketched above is unlikely to be entirely
adequate. Ultimately the right semantics will depend on the closure conditions for the
attitude verb and determining what those are is beyond the scope of this paper. Finally,
let me stress that while this semantics for desire follows, in its essentials, Heim’s (1992)
proposal, I do not mean to suggest that a Heim-style analysis of desire-verbs must be used.
I am grateful to a referee from Noûs for some critical but helpful comments on this issue.
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across Bertrand’s belief worlds differs, we capture that Bertrand’s desire is general, not
specific.
While this analysis might seem simple and intuitively correct, it faces two
immediate problems which are general and quite complex. These are therefore not
problems that I am in a position to properly address in this paper. However, I want
to stress that there is no prima facie reason to believe that these problems cannot in
principle be solved. And ultimately, I claim that (a) when these problems are solved,
my suggested analysis of definite and (presuppositional) indefinite descriptions
should provide a full-fledged solution to the existence problem, and (b) even if these
problems are solved, the currently available analyses will not be in a position to
provide a unified solution to the existence problem, i.e. a solution that captures the
conceptual similarity between definites and indefinites.34
The first problem is the technical difficulty of extending the dynamic system
above to intensional constructions such as propositional attitude ascriptions. While
Heim (1992) does provide an analysis of certain attitude verbs, her analysis builds on
Hintikka’s (1969) semantics for attitudes which is founded on propositional modal
logic. But to deal with sentences where variables are embedded in the scope of an
attitude verb, we need a more expressive system. We need a system where we can
characterize an agent’s existential beliefs, i.e. beliefs such as ‘there is a murderer’. And
while we would normally capture such existential statements using world/variable-
assignment pairs, it is not immediately clear to me how to extend this to e.g. beliefs.
That is, it is not clear to me that an agent’s beliefs can be sensibly described using
world/variable-assignment pairs.35 Solving this problem would require not only
technical ingenuity but also a rather lengthy discussion of propositional attitudes
and the more intricate details of the dynamic framework.
The second problem is, I think, more complicated, but again a thoroughly
general problem not related specifically to my proposed analysis. The problem is
that in order for the semantic system to make correct predictions in general, it must
be determined which constraints modals, i.e. propositional attitude verbs, impose on
various anaphoric relations. Consider again (3) (repeated below).
34 To clarify, it would obviously be possible for a proponent of the Frege/Strawson analysis of
definite descriptions to propose a novel analysis of e.g. indefinites where, let’s suppose, these
were not treated as quantifiers—although I do not know what form such an analysis could
take. It is also possible that the existence problem could then be generally avoided. But such
a solution would sever the connection between the meanings of definites and indefinites.
And if one is attracted to the idea that there should be a tight correspondence between
syntax and semantics, this would not be a happy result. In contrast, the analysis proposed
here maintains that these determiners share an essential component of meaning; they either
introduce discourse referents or are anaphorically linked to discourse referents.
35 Interestingly, there is, it seems, a somewhat limited amount of research on the interaction
of variables and propositional attitude verbs in Heim’s File Change Semantics. However, in
the related dynamic system of Discourse Representation Theory, it seems that some steps
towards an analysis of anaphoric expressions in attitude ascriptions has been taken, cf. e.g.
Cumming (2007), Geurts (1998), Kamp et al. (2011, 326-387), see also van van Rooy (2006).
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(3) Hans wants the ghost in his attic to be quiet tonight.
For reasons mentioned above (Karttunen’s generalization), the system should predict
that a context can be updated with (3) only if the context is such that Hans believes
that there is a ghost in his attic. But it should also predict that while (3) does trigger
a presupposition about Hans’ beliefs, (43) does not.
(43) Hans believes that there is a ghost in his attic and he wants the ghost in his
attic to be quiet tonight.
The reason is that the first conjunct of (43) asserts what is presupposed by the second
conjunct. But since I propose to analyze these descriptions as variables, this means
that the system should predict that when a discourse referent is introduced under a
belief verb — as ‘a ghost in his attic’ is in (43) — it can then function as an anaphoric
anchor for a variable embedded under another attitude verb, e.g. ‘the ghost in his
attic’ embedded under ‘want’ in (43). In other words, a discourse referent embedded
under one attitude can sometimes function as a binder for a variable embedded under
another different attitude verb. This should already be fairly obvious. However, the
problem is determining when it can have this function. To illustrate, consider the
sentences below.
(44) Hans hopes that there is [a ghost in his attic]i and he wants [the ghost]i to be
quiet tonight.
(45) Jan expected to get [a puppy]. She intended to keep [the puppy]i in her back
yard.
(46) John wants to catch [a fish]i. He plans to eat [the fish]i for supper.
(47) Alice fears that there is [a squirrel in her kitchen cabinets]i. She hopes to trap
[the squirrel]i alive.
As in (43), we here have discourse referents introduced under one attitude which
appears to neutralize the presupposition triggered by the description embedded
under another attitude. In other words, the discourse referents function as anaphoric
anchors and the system should predict that these anaphoric relations are licensed,
i.e. that there is an anaphoric relation in (44) from the discourse referent introduced
under ‘hope’ to the variable under ‘want’ and in (46) from the discourse referent
introduced under ‘want’ to the variable embedded under ‘plan’ etc. However, the
system should also predict that anaphoric relations are not immediately licensed in
(48)-(50) .
(48) # Hans wonders whether there is [a ghost in his attic]i. [The ghost]i is noisy.
(49) # Hans hopes there is [a ghost in his attic]i and he believes [the ghost]i is
quite noisy.
(50) # Jan expected to get [a puppy]i and she managed to housebreak [the puppy]i
quickly.
In order to provide a completely general solution to the existence problem, a
systematic explanation of why anaphoric relations are licensed in e.g. (44)-(47) but
not licensed in (48)-(50) is needed. What is very important to emphasize though is that
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this is nothing but a manifestation of a completely general problem already widely
familiar from the study of pronouns. An attentive reader will have noticed that one
could replace the descriptions in (44)-(50) with suitable pronouns and generate the
exact same puzzles.36
(44′) Hans hopes there is [a ghost]i in his attic and he wants iti to be quiet tonight.
(45′) Jan expected to get [a puppy]i. She intended to keep iti in her back yard.
(46′) John wants to catch [a fish]i. He plans to eat iti for supper.
(47′) Alice fears that there is [a squirrel in her kitchen cabinets]i. She hopes to trap
iti alive.
(48′) # Hans wonders whether there is [a ghost in his attic]i. Iti is noisy.
(49′) # Hans hopes there is [a ghost in his attic]i and he believes iti is quite noisy.
(50′) # Jan expected to get [a puppy]i and she managed to housebreak iti quickly.
This is, in other words, a problem concerning anaphora in intensional contexts and it
is a problem that any adequate semantic theory must ultimately address.37 And, were
it solved for the cases involving pronouns, the problem would then automatically be
solved for definite and indefinite descriptions too (if these are analyzed as variables).
4 Conclusion
This might feel like a somewhat disappointing conclusion of the paper. After all, the
existence problem remains unsolved for cases where descriptions are embedded in
the scope of a propositional attitude verb. However, my primary aim in this paper
was to demonstrate that the existence problem is a general problem that neither a
Russellian nor a Frege/Strawson analysis is in a position to solve. I also aimed to shed
light on the debate between proponents of the Russellian analysis and proponents of
the Frege/Strawson analysis. I have presented arguments against both these analyses
and proposed a step towards an analysis combining elements of both Russell’s analysis
and the Frege/Strawson analysis. On my analysis, definite descriptions presuppose,
rather than assert, existence, but it also retains in spirit the quantificational nature of
Russell’s analysis. I.e. on my analysis, definite descriptions are not referential.
Second, I wanted to establish that a solution to the existence problem requires
quite radical changes to our semantic analysis of e.g. definite and indefinite descrip-
tions. In order to establish this, I have attempted to outline the factors that cause
the existence problem and to then explicate three crucial conditions that an analysis
of definite and indefinite descriptions must satisfy in order to solve the problem, viz.
the conditions outlined in (C1)-(C3).
36 In fact, several of the cases above are simply adapted fromRoberts’ (1996) paper on anaphora
in intensional contexts.
37 This problem is an instance of the problem of modal subordination first discussed by Craige
Roberts in her (1987) dissertation. An overview of this and related problems is provided in
Roberts (1996).
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Third, I wanted to show that there is a semantic analysis which satisfies the
relevant conditions, namely my proposed dynamic analysis, and that this analysis
provides a uniform solution to the existence problem as it arises in conditionals, viz.
a solution for both definite and indefinite descriptions.
Finally, I have attempted to show that a full-fledged solution to the existence
problem relies on solutions to other complex problems. Since the existence problem
arises when definite and indefinite NPs interact with propositional attitude verbs,
this is not really surprising. But I hope to have convinced you that even though my
solution is incomplete, this is not due to a problem with the proposed analysis, but
rather the lack of solutions to these other general problems. The aim was to show
that the existence problem is a problem about the semantics of descriptions and not
solely a problem about propositional attitudes — and were these general problems
to be solved, my proposed analysis should provide a full-fledged solution.
I also want to emphasize that while I have relied in my exposition on a Heimian
style dynamic framework, nothing really essential to my proposed analysis depends
on adopting this particular dynamic framework. What I have argued could also
be argued using e.g. Discourse Representation Theory and it is certainly possible
that DRT would be better suited to (a) deal with the interaction of propositional
attitude verbs and variables (i.e. pronouns) and (b) to outline the proper restrictions
on anaphora in intensional contexts, see e.g. Kamp et al. (2011).
However, I do want to acknowledge that there are several important issues which
I have not addressed in this paper. For example, I have focused my discussion on
definite and indefinite descriptions while acknowledging that the problem also arises
for other determiner phrases. There is thus a question whether my proposed analysis
could be generalized to these other determiners. While I see no reason to think that
it could, I recognize this as an open question.
Moreover, the issue concerning what assumptions one must make about log-
ical forms in order to properly distinguish definite descriptions, presuppositional
indefinite descriptions, and pronouns from each other must be addressed. And
there are additional questions concerning how to capture the apparently different
salience requirements imposed by such expressions, cf. Ariel (2001) and Roberts
(2003). While I am convinced that any plausible answer to these questions would
complicate the theory that I have here advocated, I am also optimistic that plausible
answers could be given.
In conclusion, with the analysis proposed here, there is the prospect of a full-
fledged and uniform solution to the existence puzzle to emerge, and this is not the
case for either the standard Russellian analysis or the Frege/Strawson analysis.38
38 I am particularly grateful to Josh Dever whose comments and suggestions were integral to
writing this paper. I also want to thank Nicholas Asher, David I. Beaver, Ray Buchanan,
Herman Cappelen, Nate Charlow, Liz Coppock, Paul Elbourne, Julie Hunter, Torfinn
Huvenes, Hans Kamp, Dilip Ninan, Mark Sainsbury, Jonathan Schaffer, Andreas Stokke,
and Malte Willer for helpful comments and suggestions. I am, of course, solely responsible
for any errors.
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